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Charles Taylor on Identity Today
James McEvoy*
Studies of contemporary Western culture, and of the conceptions of human
agency which inform it, almost invariably identify an increasing emphasis on the
individual as a principal theme.  For some this individualising tendency is a
matter of loss or decline: they believe that ours is a decadent age, a narcissistic
culture, built upon corrupted views of the human.1 Others offer a decidedly more
up-beat evaluation of the individualising shift, prizing such fruits as the
development of human rights and the capacity to mobilise sentiment in response
to tragedies like the South East Asian Tsunami of 2004.  For Canadian
philosopher Charles Taylor, neither the outright knockers of contemporary
culture nor the straight boosters have plumbed the depths of our age; and nor will
a simple trade-off between advantages and costs do justice to the transition
taking place.2 In his view, a new understanding of human identity, that of
authenticity, has permeated Western culture since the 1960s, with its own insight
into the human good as well as its own debased forms.
Reflection on human agency has dominated Taylor’s writing to such a
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degree that he describes his two-volume collected papers as ‘the work of a
monomaniac.’3 In Sources of the Self, his major work of 1989, he writes a history
of the modern identity, tracing from Plato to the present the sources of
contemporary senses of self and their accompanying moral visions.4 He explores
these issues in a more popular form in The Ethics of Authenticity, which began
life as the 1991 Massey Lectures for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
Besides these two books, Taylor has written numerous articles on the nature of
the human in the West, engaging with the perspectives of other prominent
scholars.5 His recent magnum opus, A Secular Age, seeks to understand the place
of religion in this age of authenticity.6
Taylor is a synthetic thinker, drawing together philosophical and historical
perspectives as well as those of social and political theory.  Each of these
perspectives is important for his argument.  He aims to offer a faithful account of
the journey to the present, insightful analyses of concepts of the human, and an
adequate theory of previous and current sociological realities.  The immensity of
this task explains the length of Sources of the Self. 
My aim in this essay is modest: firstly, to sketch the main lines of Taylor’s view
of human identity today, particularly the place of language in human life and the
relationship between identity and the good.  Second, I will highlight some turning
points in the journey to the present that have shaped the culture of authenticity. In
conclusion I will discuss briefly what Taylor sees as the implications of the culture
of authenticity for the place of religion in the West today—an issue which may be
of particular interest to the readership of this journal.
Identity, Language and the Good
Taylor has broad philosophical interests, including hermeneutics, political
philosophy, and beyond, yet two fields are central to his understanding of the
human: philosophy of language and moral philosophy.  In this section I will
examine his contribution to these two fields in order to clarify what his
understanding of authenticity entails.
Language became a major focus for philosophical reflection during the
twentieth century.  Although the linguistic turn is often identified with the work
of seminal figures like Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the theme of
language exploded across the academy into the disciplines of linguistics,
structuralism, and social and political theory, among others, as well as into the
work of postmodernist theorists, most notably Jacques Derrida.  Furthermore, the
3. Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University, 1985), 1.
4. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University, 1989).
5. Some of these essays are collected in his Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University, 1995). Ruth Abbey maintains a comprehensive bibliography of works by and about
this prolific scholar on the University of Notre Dame website: http://nd.edu/~rabbey1/.
6. Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2007).
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explosion has reached beyond the academy to influence commonly accepted
understandings of the human person.  Taylor embraces the linguistic turn,
describing the human as a language animal, and treats this theme in his particular
way.7 A brief examination of his view of the place of language in human life will
enable us to appreciate the richness of his concept of authenticity, and to reflect
upon two related themes: an expressivist understanding of the person, and the
fundamental place of dialogue in human life.
As with much of his work, Taylor’s analysis of the nature of language runs
alongside an account of how it came to be seen as central to human existence.
Although language (logos) has been an important philosophical theme since
ancient times, and its place in the Christian scriptures means that ancient
understandings are still present in Western culture, Taylor sees the Enlightenment
and Romantic periods as the sources of the two most influential theories of
language in our day—designative and expressivist theories.
The seventeenth century scientific revolution rejected the vision of the world
as a meaningful order.8 Meaning was no longer to be found in the ideas or in the
divine Word revealed in creation.  In response to a view of the world as an
objective process rather than a meaningful order, eighteenth century
Enlightenment views of language focussed on the meaning of words qua words.
In these views, thought simply represents things and assembles ideas, and
language comes to be seen as ‘an instrument of control in the assemblage of
ideas.’9 As an instrument of control, words must be clear and distinct in order to
portray accurately the reality they designate.  Language, therefore, cannot have a
dimension of mystery; it must be perfectly transparent.  In summary, words have
meaning to the extent that they designate or point to objects.  Eighteenth century
French philosopher Condillac, who builds upon Locke, explains the origin of
language with a fable of two children in a desert who invent signs (instituted
signs) to refer to cries of distress (natural signs)—the sign would refer to the
cause of distress, and in this process the first sign would be instituted.10
Following eighteenth century German philosopher Herder, Taylor argues
that Condillac’s story of origins presupposes the very reality that it attempts to
explain.  According to Taylor, Condillac’s explanation amounts to saying that
‘the words arose because the words were already there.’11 Condillac’s story takes
7. See particularly Taylor, ‘Language and Human Nature,’ Human Agency and Language, 215- 47;
‘The Importance of Herder,’ Philosophical Arguments, 79-99; ‘Heidegger, Language, and
Ecology,’ Philosophical Arguments, 100-26. For studies of Taylor’s philosophy of language see:
Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor, Philosophy Now Series (Princeton: Princeton University, 2000),
chapters 1 & 4; and Nicholas H. Smith, ‘Taylor and the Hermeneutic Tradition,’ Charles Taylor,
ed. Ruth Abbey. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 29-51.
8. Taylor’s account of the theories of language in the Enlightenment and Romantic periods can be
found in Taylor, ‘Language and Human Nature,’ 222-34.
9. Taylor, ‘Language and Human Nature,’ 226. Emphasis in original.
10. See Taylor, ‘The Importance of Herder,’ 80-81.
11. Taylor, ‘The Importance of Herder,’ 81.
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the relation of signifying for granted.  It’s always possible to learn a new word,
Herder argues, but to understand what it means for a word to signify something
is precisely the problem which Condillac does not address.  Taylor sees Herder
as a hinge figure in the transition to a new understanding of language—that of
Romanticism.
Taylor believes that Romanticism gives a more adequate account of
language than the designative view.  Following Herder, he sees language as the
vehicle of reflective awareness: it expresses and realizes reflective awareness.
Finding the right word in a situation requires more than an adequate vocabulary:
it requires the capacity to recognise that this word is the right word.  And this
capacity for recognition requires a person to locate an object within a whole web
of meaning.  For example, a triangle can only be named as such when a person
can distinguish between different shapes, and distinguish shapes from colour and
texture, and so forth.  To use language, therefore, is not simply to designate
something: rather, it is ‘to touch a bit of the web [of meaning], and to make the
whole resonate.’12 This is what Taylor means by language as expressive and the
person as a language being: human consciousness comes to be in its expression,
in language.
It would be possible to take the expressivist view of language in a purely
subjectivist direction and many people do.  They see the act of expression purely
in terms of the individual: expressing a meaning within an individual.  But Taylor
argues that although subjectivist views capture aspects of the activity of
language, they are ultimately inadequate because language is embedded in a
culture or form of life.  In using language, therefore, each person is both shaped
by and shapes language. Language is never a wholly individual matter—it is
fundamentally dialogical. Taylor’s view can be encapsulated in his definition of
language as:
A pattern of activity, by which we express/realize a certain way of being
in the world, that of reflective awareness, but a pattern which can only
be deployed against a background which we can never fully dominate;
and yet a background that we are never fully dominated by, because we
are constantly reshaping it.  Reshaping it without dominating it, or
being able to oversee it, means that we never fully know what we are
doing to it; we develop language without knowing fully what we are
making it into.13
In summary, it can be seen that Taylor’s expressivist understanding of both
language and human existence has important implications for his concept of
authenticity.  Language is not merely a set of labels; nor is it simply instrumental.
12. Taylor, ‘Language and Human Nature,’ 231.
13. Taylor, ‘Language and Human Nature,’ 232.
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Rather, it is formative of the subject in that it is the vehicle of self-awareness—
language enables the subject to express him- or herself.  Yet it is not the property
of an individual since it is fundamentally dialogical: it shapes the speech
community, which in turn shapes language.  This leads Taylor to the insight that
self-expression is never solely inwardly generated; it always exists in relationship
to the speech community.
Alongside the theme of language, Taylor explores another dimension of
human nature: that the person is always inextricably intertwined with the good.
When we seek to understand human existence, Taylor believes that we quickly
encounter the good.  In the first section of Sources of the Self he develops the
connection between identity and the good in dialogue with other influential
moral theories of the twentieth century.14 A consideration of these other positions
is well beyond the scope of this essay: I will simply outline the connection that
Taylor sees between identity and the good.  Yet it must be said at the outset that
his understanding of the good avoids the narrow focus of many modern moral
philosophies which pursue questions of the good only in terms of what it is right
to do.  For Taylor, the larger question of what it is good to be is primary, and in
this context he explores questions of dignity, respect, and what makes life
meaningful.
Taylor outlines the relationship between identity and the good in three
fundamental steps: it involves frameworks, a defining community, and a
constitutive good.  First, in an argument which reflects some of his earlier work
on language, Taylor states that our moral responses have meaning within a
framework—a crucial set of qualitative distinctions.  When we spell out what we
presuppose in judging some form of life to be good, we necessarily make what
he calls qualitative distinctions: we judge some things as higher than others.
These higher things are ends or life goods which cannot be measured on the same
scale as ordinary ends or goods.  Our qualitative distinctions create a framework
within which we make sense of our lives and our world and in reference to which
we act.  Taylor’s argument is that living within a framework is constitutive of
human agency; that living outside of some sort of framework is impossible.  In
his words: ‘Frameworks provide the background, explicit or implicit, for our
moral judgements, intuitions or reactions. … To articulate a framework is to
explicate what makes sense of our moral responses.’15
One way of bringing these frameworks into focus is by asking the common
question: who am I? It can only be answered in any meaningful way by stating
what is of crucial importance for me.  That is, in Taylor’s words, ‘my identity is
defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or
horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or
valuable.’16 Frameworks enable me to judge what is of value.
14. For reflection on Taylor’s moral theory, see Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor, chapter 1.
15. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 26.
16. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 27.
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Second, in his study of the relationship between identity and the good,
Taylor articulates another of the transcendental conditions of identity: that it
necessarily involves a social or communal reference.  Again, this argument has
similar lines to his reflection on language.  An answer to the question ‘who am
I?’ can only be offered with reference to the people who surround me.  In Taylor’s
words, ‘The full definition of somebody’s identity thus usually involves not only
his stand on moral and spiritual matters, but also some reference to a defining
community.’17 Or, to use a linguistic image, we exist only within ‘webs of
interlocution.’18 Yet here it is important to avoid a common confusion about the
communitarian nature of identity.  The fact that we come to be ourselves within
a community does not mean that we are determined by that community.  We may
change our understanding of ourselves within our community and may even
change our relationship to our defining community, but that in no way changes
our dependence on the webs of interlocution.  As Taylor says, ‘it only changes
the webs and the nature of our dependence.’19
Third, Taylor traces another structural feature of our moral life: that
underlying the life goods located by our qualitative distinctions or frameworks
(the first step) is a deeper, more fundamental good, which he calls a constitutive
good.  As he puts it, our qualitative distinctions necessarily ‘refer us to some
feature of the way things are, in virtue of which these goods are good.’20 A
constitutive good is good in a fuller sense because relationship to it is what
constitutes our actions or aspirations as good.  Furthermore, Taylor argues that
love of the constitutive good is the source of human motivation: ‘The constitutive
good does more than just define the content of the moral theory.  Love of it is
what empowers us to be good.  And hence also loving it is part of what it is to be
a good human being.’21 In surveying contemporary Western culture, Taylor sees
a range of constitutive goods at work.  For those who believe in God, it is the
divine love which gives meaning to all life goods.  For many humanists, deeply
influenced by Kant’s notion of dignity, human autonomy and the agent’s capacity
to act out of respect for the moral law form the constitutive good.  Taylor also
sees Plato’s notion of the Idea of the Good acting as a constitutive moral source
for some.
In summary, the connections which Taylor makes between identity and the
good give a particular shape to his concept of human authenticity.  Authenticity
concerns the way a person understands him- or herself; however, it is neither
free-floating nor purely inwardly generated.  Taylor’s three fundamental steps in
the relationship between identity and the good—framework, defining
community, and constitutive good—are inescapable structural requirements of
17. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 36.
18. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 36.
19. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 39.
20. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 93.
21. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 93.
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human agency.  So, living an authentic life means that there are realities that I
value, which I have come to discern within a significant community, and which
make sense in relationship to an ultimate good, the love of which enables me to
do and to be good.  In that sense, the movement into an authentic life has the
character of a ‘quest’ and is often articulated in narrative.
In examining Taylor’s views of both language and the relationship between
identity and the good, I have shown that the concept of authenticity has a central
place.  Yet it has specific parameters.  An entirely subjectivist understanding of
authenticity makes no sense in his terms.  No one simply generates their identity
from within themselves.  Each person’s identity is formed in relationship to those
realities that he or she comes to see as good, discovered within a defining
community, and in relationship to that which is ultimately good.  This is one
aspect—the philosophical aspect—of Taylor’s view of the place of authenticity
in contemporary culture.  The other aspect is his historical account of the way in
which the notion of authenticity has come to have such a prominent place today.
I will turn to that now.
Identity in an Age of Authenticity
Taylor devotes over 400 pages of Sources of the Self to his history of the
modern identity.  He begins with Plato and moves on to Augustine but the heart
of his story is the emergence of Enlightenment and Romantic concepts of the
self.  His argument is that the struggles and moral disputes that characterise our
age have their roots in these two understandings of human identity.  In A Secular
Age he extends the story, showing how the individuating revolutions of the
Enlightenment and Romanticism entered a new phase in the 1960s—a phase
which he names the age of authenticity.22 The limits of this essay again demand
only a schematic account of Taylor’s detailed story of the development of the
modern identity.  I will highlight those three phases in the development of the
modern identity in order to spell out what he means when he describes
contemporary Western culture as one of authenticity.
Fundamental to the eighteenth century Enlightenment view of the human
was a new understanding of freedom.23 The radical thinkers of the Enlightenment
rejected the notion of providence and providential order central to Deism.  In
turning away from a vision of the order of things, they regarded nature as a
neutral domain which had to be understood in order to master it.  In this context,
human nature was also re-assessed and seen as neither inherently good nor bad
but as neutral.  The focus of reflection on the human changed: rather than looking
to an external, cosmic order to understand human nature, Enlightenment thinkers
looked inward.  People would discover their purposes in themselves: the free
22. Taylor, A Secular Age, chapter 13.
23. My discussion of the Enlightenment and Romanticism follows Taylor’s analysis in Sources of
the Self, chapters 18-21. For a study of Taylor’s approach to these matters, see Abbey, Charles
Taylor, 81-100.
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subject had an internal purpose with no a priori allegiance to a pre-existing order.
Freedom, therefore, was no longer defined in relation to the whole—the polis or
republic: an atomist concept of freedom developed,24 in which the subject was
seen to enjoy natural liberty in the state of nature.  So, characteristic of the
Enlightenment approach to the human is the stance of disengagement: the
capacity to stand over oneself in order to understand and master oneself.
Yet the Enlightenment approach to the human was not driven simply by
theoretical speculation: it was ethically motivated.  Utility was the key concern:
the maximisation of happiness and the diminishment of suffering.
Enlightenment thinkers saw themselves as the most effective defenders of the
fulfilment of ordinary needs.  Taylor summarises the moral motivation of the
Enlightenment view: ‘In giving central significance to sensual pleasure and pain,
and in challenging all the different conceptions of order, the utilitarians made it
possible for the first time to put the relief of suffering, human but also animal, at
the centre of the social agenda.  This has had truly revolutionary effects in
modern society, transforming not only our legal system but the whole range of
our practices and concerns.’25
In summary, Taylor sees the Enlightenment as the first major step in the
journey to the culture of authenticity.  It was an individuating revolution, one
which led to a certain sense of inwardness: people no longer understood
themselves in relation to a cosmic order, but came to see their thoughts, ideas and
feelings as within themselves.  Of course, Taylor is not claiming that there were
no opposing views at the time; nor is he claiming that no-one in our day
understands human life in relation to a meaningful cosmic order.  He is claiming
that belief in a meaningful cosmic order no longer underpins the shared, public
framework of meaning today.26 He is also claiming that this notion of inwardness
has profoundly changed contemporary self-understanding.  An essential facet of
the development of this disengaged sense of self during the Enlightenment was
its moral motivation: the fostering of ordinary happiness and the relief of
suffering.  Both the sense of inwardness and the significance of ordinary
fulfilments remain important facets of Western culture in the twenty-first century.
The second major step that Taylor identifies in the journey to the culture of
authenticity is the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment.  Romanticism is a
family of views that arose in late-eighteenth century Germany, and was
profoundly indebted to the thought of Rousseau.  Romantics reacted against the
disengaged stance of the Enlightenment, arguing that in objectifying nature,
Enlightenment thinkers erected barriers between humans and nature, and even
24. For Taylor, the term atomism characterizes ‘a vision of society as in some sense constituted by
individuals for the fulfillment of ends which were primarily individual.’ See ‘Atomism,’
Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University, 1985), 189-210, at 189. 
25. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 331.
26. See Abbey, Charles Taylor, 81-82.
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created divisions within humans themselves.27 The Romantic movement aspired
to bring the human back into contact with nature.  Taylor sees the turn toward
nature as the central philosophical insight of Romanticism: ‘This notion of an
inner voice or impulse, the idea that we find the truth within us, and in particular
in our feelings—these were the crucially justifying concepts of the Romantic
rebellion in its various forms.’28 Some Romantics identified the voice of nature
as particular to each person.  For others, the voice of nature is the voice in us of
nature—the larger order in which we find ourselves. One of the earliest and most
important proponents of this second view was Herder, for whom nature was a
great current of sympathy flowing through all things.  The role of humanity, in
his view, was to bring the current of sympathy to consciousness.
Another integral feature of Romanticism is what Taylor calls expressivism.
When access to nature is through an inner voice, we can only fully know nature
through articulating what we find within ourselves.  I must turn inward to discover
what is within me; a task that only I can carry out and one which no-one else can
fully understand.  Therefore, the truth of my identity does not pre-exist my own
expression of it: my expressing my inner truth brings it into existence. 
It is Taylor’s claim that Romanticism, with its expressivist understanding of
the self, is the second significant turning point in the journey to the culture of
authenticity.  Expressivism fosters a stronger emphasis on the individuality of
every person: each individual is different and original and the originality of the
individual determines how he or she should live.  Of course, the understanding
that each person is different is not a discovery of the Romantic period; but
conceiving difference and originality as determining how a person should live is
new.  In the Romantic, expressivist view, each person has an original path he or
she ought to tread.29
The third and final step in Taylor’s account of the journey to the age of
authenticity occurs in the 1960s.  At this time, he says, expressivist individualism
becomes a mass phenomenon.30 The change was precipitated by a range of social
factors, including social mobility, the consumer revolution and the creation of a
special youth market, but what most interests Taylor is the changing
understanding of human agency.  He says: ‘We see a steady spread of what I have
called the culture of “authenticity”.  I mean the understanding of life which
emerges with the Romantic expressivism of the late-eighteenth century, that each
one of us has his/her own way of realizing our humanity, and that it is important
to find and live out one’s own, as against surrendering to conformity with a
model imposed on us from outside, by society, or the previous generation, or
religious or political authority.’31 Nineteenth and early-twentieth century artists
27. See Taylor, Sources of the Self, 383-86.
28. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 368-69.
29. Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity explores the richness and limitations of this view.
30. He explores this theme most fully in A Secular Age, chapter 13.
31. Taylor, A Secular Age, 475.
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and intellectuals were important figures in the gradual spread of expressivism,
but it is only in the ’60s that it swept through the popular culture of the West.
Taylor’s account of the journey to the culture of authenticity provides us
with an insightful perspective from which to discern the richness and limits of the
present.  Post 1960s Western culture is certainly filled with its own contradictions
and dilemmas: some of its ideals exist in a great deal of tension.  For example,
the attempt to hold together and realize in any community the ideals of self
expression, the fulfilment of ordinary desires, and equal relationships will
necessarily involve a great deal of tension.32 But Taylor’s account enables us to
see that the strengths and limits of our culture must be judged from the
perspective of this new vision of the human good—that of authenticity.  The
outright knockers, who judge this culture as narcissistic, fail to see how
profoundly the notion of authenticity has shaped the self-understanding of this
age for the good, whatever the culture’s limits.  It’s difficult in our day to imagine
what it might mean to be myself without the contemporary notion of authenticity.
On the other hand, the straight boosters, who cherish the advances of science and
the freedom that the culture of authenticity allows, often put out of the mind all
that authenticity entails: that I only come to know myself in relationship to that
which is ultimately good, and within a defining community.  Fostering our
common life and our relationship to that which is ultimately good is critical for
the success of this culture.
Religion in an Age of Authenticity
In A Secular Age Taylor sets out to show that the place of religion in the West
today is best understood in the context of the shift to the culture of authenticity.
Yet again, this is a cultural perspective.  He argues that accounts of the process
of secularisation simply in terms of the separation of church and state, or simply
in terms of a decline of religious belief and practice do not do justice to the broad
cultural transition.  The whole context of our moral and religious experience has
shifted.  The conditions of belief have changed, he says, ‘the shift to secularity
in this sense consists, among other things, of a move from a society where belief
in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is
understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to
embrace.’33 Taylor’s fascinating account, over almost 800 pages, shows
expressivism making a critical impact on the imagined place of the sacred.  As a
result of the expressivist outlook penetrating popular culture in the 1960s, the
choice over religious denominations that was already possible in the nineteenth
century is taken a stage further.  Now, in his words, ‘the religious life or practice
that I become part of must not only be my choice, but it must speak to me, it must
make sense in terms of my spiritual development as I understand this.’34 While
32. Taylor, A Secular Age, 477.
33. Taylor, A Secular Age, 3.
34. Taylor, A Secular Age, 486.
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maintaining the frameworks of belief will be difficult in an expressivist age, the
desire to live an authentic spiritual life must be applauded.
No doubt, the search for an experience of the spiritual that ‘speaks to them’
leads some people in our day to fairly undemanding spiritual options.  In
response, the outright knockers of Western culture condemn this age, equating it
with these flattened forms of the spiritual life.  But equating the age of
authenticity with its most debased forms is a major error, in Taylor’s view.35 The
flattened forms do not do justice to the whole movement toward authenticity,
which also has Christian roots and influences the best of religious lives for the
good.  The search for authenticity can be seen as an attempt at a cultural level to
live out Augustine’s famous line: ‘You have made us for yourself, and our heart
is restless until it rests in you.’36
In this new cultural context, the critical question for the church is: how can
it best proclaim the gospel?  The Second Vatican Council, in the process of
writing the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, recognised
the need to re-consider the Roman Catholic Church’s relationship with the world.
The Council abandoned an attachment to the worldview of Christendom, to
which the church had clung through the nineteenth century until the eve of
Vatican II.37 In Gaudium et spes, the Council conceived of the church-world
relationship in terms of a dialogue, through which the church could contribute to
both individuals and societies.  Recognizing that individuals are searching to
make sense of existence, the Council sees the church as ‘entrusted with making
manifest the mystery of God who is our ultimate goal, at the same time it
discloses to us the meaning of our existence, or the intimate truth about
ourselves’ (GS 41).  The Council also sees the church making a substantial
contribution to a dialogue with society, saying that the church’s ‘mission of a
religious nature produces a function, enlightenment and resources which can be
of service in constructing and strengthening the human community’ (GS 42).  Yet
a dialogue is two-way and with this in mind, the Council states firstly that the
church has received much from the world, ‘from the history and development of
the human race’ (GS 44).  Because of what it has received, the Council then
teaches that the believing community must constantly keep itself open to the
world in order that it may learn of that to which it is called.  In the Council’s
words:
It is for God’s people as a whole, with the help of the Holy Spirit, and
especially for pastors and theologians, to listen to the various voices of
35. Taylor discusses this issue in A Secular Age, 506-13.
36. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991), 3.
37. Second Vatican Council, ‘Gaudium et spes,’ in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Volume II,
ed. Giuseppe Alberigo and Norman P. Tanner, 2 vols. (Washington: Georgetown University,
1990). References to ‘Gaudium et spes’ will be placed in brackets in the text. I have explored
Vatican II’s understanding of the church-world relationship in: ‘Church and World at Vatican II:
The Significance of Gaudium et spes,’ Pacifica 19, no. 1 (February 2006): 37-57.
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our day, discerning them and interpreting them, and to evaluate them in
the light of the divine word, so that the revealed truth can be
increasingly appropriated, better understood and more suitably
expressed. (GS 44)
Only through attentiveness to the various voices of the day will the church
be able to proclaim the gospel faithfully. In summary, the dialogical relationship
envisaged in Gaudium et spes could be put in these terms: the church, founded
in the gospel, responds to the desires and struggles of this age, while listening for
the voice of the Spirit in the world.
While engaged in dialogue with the world, the church will certainly run up
against the limits of the culture of authenticity, and particularly the temptation to
see authenticity in subjectivist terms.  When authenticity is seen predominantly
in terms of self-creation, it is difficult to engage the broader and deeper questions
of meaning in which our moral and religious lives are situated.  Those engaged
in dialogue, therefore, will have to face the challenge of leading their
interlocutors beyond the stance of self-creation toward the frameworks of
meaning on which their stance depends.38
38. I have discussed the church’s proclamatory task in the age of authenticity in: ‘Proclamation as
Dialogue: Transition in the Church–World Relationship,’ Theological Studies (forthcoming).
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